不便外发的段落 | 环球银行金融电信协会 / SWIFT

正文8. 争议 | Controversy

文中可能包含无法从中国内地访问的链接。

8.1 效率低下 | Inefficiency

Swift has been criticised for inefficiency. In 2018, the London-based Financial Times noted that transfers frequently "pass through multiple banks before reaching their final destination, making them time-consuming, costly and lacking transparency on how much money will arrive at the other end".[3] Swift has since introduced an improved service called "Global Payments Innovation" (GPI), claiming it was adopted by 165 banks and was completing half its payments within 30 minutes.[3] The new standard which included Swift Go was supposed to be utilised in receiving and transferring low-value international payments. One of the significant changes was the transaction amount, which would not differ from start to end. However, as of 2023, uptake was mixed. For instance, Alisherov Eraj, Alif Bank Treasury Department Swift Transfers & Banking Relationship Expert in the Republic of Tajikistan, describes that the leading cause for the late Swift Go adoption in Tajikistan was the Core Banking System itself. To connect to Swift Go, he adds, banking system interfaces needed to be upgraded and integrated with their software to be fully compatible; this hindered many banks from adopting the technology earlier.
【参考译文】Swift因效率低下而受到批评。2018年，伦敦《金融时报》指出，资金转账往往“要经过多家银行才能到达最终目的地，这使得转账耗时长、成本高，且收款方无法得知到账金额”。[3]此后，Swift推出了一项名为“全球支付创新”（GPI）的改进服务，声称已有165家银行采用该服务，且其中一半支付可在30分钟内完成。[3]这一新标准（包括Swift Go）本应用于接收和转汇小额国际支付。其中一项重大变化是交易金额从始至终保持不变。然而，截至2023年，Swift Go的普及情况喜忧参半。例如，塔吉克斯坦阿利夫银行（Alif Bank）财资部Swift转账与银行业务关系专家阿里舍罗夫·埃拉杰（Alisherov Eraj）表示，塔吉克斯坦迟迟未采用Swift Go的主要原因是核心银行系统本身。他补充道，为接入Swift Go，银行系统接口需要升级并与软件集成以实现完全兼容；这阻碍了多家银行早期采用该技术。

8.2 美国政府监控 | U.S. government surveillance

A series of articles published on 23 June 2006 in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and the Los Angeles Times revealed a program, named the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, which the US Treasury Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other United States governmental agencies initiated after the 11 September attacks to gain access to the SWIFT transaction database.[33]
【参考译文】2006年6月23日，《纽约时报》、《华尔街日报》和《洛杉矶时报》发表了一系列文章，揭露了一个名为“恐怖主义融资追踪计划”的项目。该项目由美国财政部、中央情报局（CIA）和其他美国政府机构在9·11恐怖袭击事件后发起，目的是获取SWIFT交易数据库的信息。[33]

After the publication of these articles, SWIFT quickly came under pressure for compromising the data privacy of its customers by allowing governments to gain access to sensitive personal information. In September 2006, the Belgian government declared that these SWIFT dealings with American governmental authorities were a breach of Belgian and European privacy laws.[34]
【参考译文】这些文章发表后，SWIFT迅速面临压力，因其允许政府获取敏感的个人信息，从而损害了客户的数据隐私。2006年9月，比利时政府宣布，SWIFT与美国政府当局的这些交易违反了比利时和欧洲的隐私法律。[34]

In response, and to satisfy members' concerns about privacy, SWIFT began a process of improving its architecture by implementing a distributed architecture with a two-zone model for storing messages (see § Operations centres).
【参考译文】为回应此事并满足成员对隐私的担忧，SWIFT开始通过实施采用双区模型存储消息的分布式架构（见“运营中心”一节），来改进其架构。

Concurrently, the European Union negotiated an agreement with the United States government to permit the transfer of intra-EU SWIFT transaction information to the United States under certain circumstances. Because of concerns about its potential contents, the European Parliament adopted a position statement in September 2009, demanding to see the full text of the agreement and asking that it be fully compliant with EU privacy legislation, with oversight mechanisms emplaced to ensure that all data requests were handled appropriately.[35] An interim agreement was signed without European Parliamentary approval by the European Council on 30 November 2009,[36] the day before the Lisbon Treaty—which would have prohibited such an agreement from being signed under the terms of the codecision procedure—formally came into effect. While the interim agreement was scheduled to come into effect on 1 January 2010, the text of the agreement was classified as "EU Restricted" until translations could be provided in all EU languages and published on 25 January 2010.
【参考译文】与此同时，欧洲联盟与美国政府谈判达成了一项协议，允许在某些情况下将欧盟内部的SWIFT交易信息传递给美国。由于担心该协议可能包含的内容，欧洲议会于2009年9月通过了一项立场声明，要求查阅协议的全文，并要求该协议完全符合欧盟的隐私立法，同时设立监督机制，以确保所有数据请求都得到妥善处理。[35]2009年11月30日，即《里斯本条约》正式生效的前一天（该条约本会根据共同决定程序禁止签署此类协议），欧洲理事会在未经欧洲议会批准的情况下签署了一项临时协议。[36]虽然临时协议原定于2010年1月1日生效，但协议文本一直被列为“欧盟机密”，直到2010年1月25日提供所有欧盟语言的译文并予以公布。

On 11 February 2010, the European Parliament decided to reject the interim agreement between the EU and the US by 378 to 196 votes.[37][38] One week earlier, the parliament's civil liberties committee had already rejected the deal, citing legal reservations.[39]
【参考译文】2010年2月11日，欧洲议会以378票对196票的决定性投票结果否决了欧盟与美国之间的临时协议。[37][38]一周前，议会的公民自由委员会已以存在法律保留意见为由否决了该协议。[39]

In March 2011, it was reported that two mechanisms of data protection had failed: EUROPOL released a report complaining that requests for information from the US had been too vague (making it impossible to make judgments on validity)[40] and that the guaranteed right for European citizens to know whether their information had been accessed by US authorities had not been put into practice.[40]
【参考译文】2011年3月，据报道，两项数据保护机制均已失效：欧洲刑警组织（EUROPOL）发布了一份报告，抱怨来自美国的信息请求过于模糊（使得无法判断其有效性），[40]并且欧洲公民有权知晓其信息是否被美国当局获取这一保证并未得到落实。[40]

Der Spiegel reported in September 2013 that the National Security Agency (NSA) widely monitors banking transactions via SWIFT, as well as credit card transactions.[41] The NSA intercepted and retained data from the SWIFT network used by thousands of banks to securely send transaction information. SWIFT was named as a "target", according to documents leaked by Edward Snowden. The documents revealed that the NSA spied on SWIFT using a variety of methods, including reading "SWIFT printer traffic from numerous banks".[41] In April 2017, a group known as the Shadow Brokers released files allegedly from the NSA which indicate that the agency monitored financial transactions made through SWIFT.[42][43]
【参考译文】《明镜周刊》于2013年9月报道称，国家安全局（NSA）通过SWIFT广泛监控银行交易以及信用卡交易。[41]NSA拦截并保留了数千家银行用来安全发送交易信息的SWIFT网络中的数据。根据爱德华·斯诺登（Edward Snowden）泄露的文件，SWIFT被列为了“目标”。这些文件显示，NSA使用多种方法监视SWIFT，包括“读取多家银行的SWIFT打印机流量”。[41]2017年4月，一个名为“影子经纪人”（Shadow Brokers）的组织发布了据称来自NSA的文件，这些文件表明该机构监控了通过SWIFT进行的金融交易。[42][43]

8.3 SWIFT与制裁 | SWIFT and sanctions

SWIFT表示，作为一家具有环球系统性的、中立的公用事业机构，无权做出制裁决定，对国家或个人实体实施或取消制裁的任何决定完全取决于主管政府机构和立法者[6]。

8.3.1 伊朗 | Iran

In January 2012, the advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) implemented a campaign calling on SWIFT to end all relations with Iran's banking system, including the Central Bank of Iran. UANI asserted that Iran's membership in SWIFT violated US and EU financial sanctions against Iran as well as SWIFT's own corporate rules.[44]
【参考译文】2012年1月，倡导组织“反对伊朗核计划联合阵线”(UANI)发起了一项运动，呼吁SWIFT终止与伊朗银行系统（包括伊朗中央银行）的所有关系。UANI声称，伊朗作为SWIFT的成员国，违反了美国和欧盟对伊朗实施的金融制裁，也违反了SWIFT自身的公司章程。[44]

Consequently, in February 2012, the U.S. Senate Banking Committee unanimously approved sanctions against SWIFT aimed at pressuring it to terminate its ties with blacklisted Iranian banks. Expelling Iranian banks from SWIFT would potentially deny Iran access to billions of dollars in revenue using SWIFT but not from using IVTS. Mark Wallace, president of UANI, praised the Senate Banking Committee.[45]
【参考译文】因此，2012年2月，美国参议院银行委员会一致通过对SWIFT的制裁，旨在迫使其终止与被列入黑名单的伊朗银行的关系。将伊朗银行逐出SWIFT可能会使伊朗无法使用SWIFT获取数十亿美元的收入，但并不影响其使用国际银行间金融电信协会（IVTS）的服务。UANI主席马克·华莱士（Mark Wallace）对参议院银行委员会表示了赞扬。[45]

Initially SWIFT denied that it was acting illegally,[45] but later[when?] said that "it is working with U.S. and European governments to address their concerns that its financial services are being used by Iran to avoid sanctions and conduct illicit business".[46] Targeted banks would be—amongst others—Saderat Bank of Iran, Bank Mellat, Post Bank of Iran and Sepah Bank.[47] On 17 March 2012, following an agreement two days earlier between all 27 member states of the Council of the European Union and the council's subsequent ruling, SWIFT disconnected all Iranian banks that had been identified as institutions in breach of current EU sanctions from its international network and warned that even more Iranian financial institutions could be disconnected from the network.
【参考译文】最初，SWIFT否认其行为违法，[45]但随后（具体时间未提及）表示，“SWIFT正在与美国和欧洲政府合作，以解决他们担心的伊朗利用其金融服务规避制裁和从事非法交易的问题”。[46]被瞄准的银行包括伊朗萨德拉银行、伊朗梅拉特银行、伊朗邮政银行和伊朗塞帕银行等。[47]2012年3月17日，在欧洲联盟理事会所有27个成员国于两天前达成协议以及理事会随后作出裁决后，SWIFT将其国际网络中已被认定为违反现行欧盟制裁规定的所有伊朗银行断开连接，并警告称，更多伊朗金融机构可能会被从网络中断开连接。

In February 2016, most Iranian banks reconnected to the network following the lift of sanctions due to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[48] 【参考译文】2016年2月，由于《联合全面行动计划》的实施导致制裁取消，大多数伊朗银行重新连接到了该网络。[48]

在美国退出伊朗核协议、重启对伊朗制裁后，2018年11月，SWIFT切断了重新被纳入特别指定国民和被屏蔽人员中的伊朗金融机构的连接。

8.3.2 以色列 | Israel

In 2014, SWIFT rejected calls from pro-Palestinian activists to revoke Israeli banks' access to its network owing to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory.[49]
【参考译文】2014年，SWIFT拒绝了亲巴勒斯坦活动人士的要求，即因以色列占领巴勒斯坦领土而撤销以色列银行使用其网络的权限。[49]

8.3.3 俄罗斯和白俄罗斯 | Russia and Belarus

See also: SWIFT ban against Russian banks【另请参阅：对俄罗斯银行的SWIFT禁令】

Similarly, in August 2014 the UK planned to press the EU to block Russian use of SWIFT as a sanction due to Russian military intervention in Ukraine.[50] However, SWIFT refused to do so.[51] SPFS, a Russian alternative to SWIFT, was developed by the Central Bank of Russia as a backup measure.[52]
【参考译文】同样地，2014年8月，英国计划施压欧盟，要求对因俄罗斯军事干预乌克兰而实施制裁，阻止俄罗斯使用SWIFT。[50]然而，SWIFT拒绝了这一要求。[51]作为SWIFT的俄罗斯替代品，俄罗斯央行开发了SPFS作为备用措施。[52]

During the prelude to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States developed preliminary possible sanctions against Russia, but excluded banning Russia from SWIFT.[53] Following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the foreign ministers of the Baltic states Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia called for Russia to be cut off from SWIFT. However, other EU member states were reluctant, both because European lenders held most of the nearly $30 billion in foreign banks' exposure to Russia and because Russia had developed the SPFS alternative.[54] The European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States finally agreed to remove a few Russian banks from the SWIFT messaging system in response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine; the governments of France, Germany, Italy and Japan individually released statements alongside the EU.[55][11]
【参考译文】在2022年俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的前奏中，美国制定了针对俄罗斯的初步可能制裁措施，但排除了将俄罗斯排除在SWIFT之外的选项。[53]2022年俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后，波罗的海国家立陶宛、拉脱维亚和爱沙尼亚的外交部长呼吁将俄罗斯排除在SWIFT之外。然而，其他欧盟成员国却犹豫不决，原因一是欧洲贷款机构持有外国银行对俄罗斯敞口的近300亿美元中的大部分，二是俄罗斯已经开发了SPFS作为替代系统。[54]欧盟、英国、加拿大和美国最终同意将部分俄罗斯银行从SWIFT信息系统中剔除，以回应2022年俄罗斯入侵乌克兰；法国、德国、意大利和日本政府也分别与欧盟一同发表了声明。[55][11]

On 20 March 2023, Russia was banned from SWIFT.[56][57]
【参考译文】2023年3月20日，俄罗斯被正式排除在SWIFT之外。[56][57]

The European Union issued the first set of sanctions against Belarus - the first was introduced on 27 February 2022, which banned certain categories of Belarusian items in the EU, including timber, steel, mineral fuels and tobacco.[58] After the Lithuanian prime minister proposed disconnecting Belarus from SWIFT,[59] the European Union, which does not recognise Lukashenko as the legitimate President of Belarus, started to plan an extension of the sanctions already issued against Russian entities and top officials to its ally.[60]
【参考译文】欧盟对白俄罗斯实施了第一套制裁措施——第一套制裁措施于2022年2月27日出台，禁止在欧盟境内销售特定类别的白俄罗斯产品，包括木材、钢铁、矿物燃料和烟草。[58]在立陶宛总理提议将白俄罗斯排除在SWIFT之外后，[59]欧盟（不承认卢卡申科为白俄罗斯合法总统）开始计划将其已经对俄罗斯实体和高层官员实施的制裁扩展到其盟友白俄罗斯。[60]

8.3.4 朝鲜

2017年3月，在联合国安理会报告显示朝鲜“绕过国际制裁进行违禁物品贸易”，批评成员国未能全面实施制裁的情况下[9]，SWIFT将朝鲜依然留在该系统的银行以“不再符合成员准入标准”理由剔除[10]。

8.4 安全 | Security

See also: Bangladesh Bank robbery【另请参阅：孟加拉国银行抢劫案】

In 2016 an $81 million theft from the Bangladesh central bank via its account at the New York Federal Reserve Bank was traced to hacker penetration of SWIFT's Alliance Access software, according to a New York Times report. It was not the first such attempt, the society acknowledged, and the security of the transfer system was undergoing new examination accordingly.[61] Soon after the reports of the theft from the Bangladesh central bank, a second, apparently related, attack was reported to have occurred at a commercial bank in Vietnam.[62][63]
【参考译文】据《纽约时报》报道，2016年，孟加拉国中央银行通过其在纽约联邦储备银行的账户被盗走8100万美元，这起案件被追溯到黑客侵入了SWIFT的Alliance Access软件。SWIFT承认，这并不是第一次发生此类事件，因此转账系统的安全性正在接受新的审查。[61]在孟加拉国中央银行被盗案件报道后不久，据称越南一家商业银行也发生了第二起看似相关的攻击。[62][63]

Both attacks involved malware written to both issue unauthorized SWIFT messages and to conceal that the messages had been sent. After the malware sent the SWIFT messages that stole the funds, it deleted the database record of the transfers and then took further steps to prevent confirmation messages from revealing the theft. In the Bangladeshi case, the confirmation messages would have appeared on a paper report; the malware altered the paper reports when they were sent to the printer. In the second case, the bank used a PDF report; the malware altered the PDF viewer to hide the transfers.[62]
【参考译文】这两起攻击都涉及恶意软件，该软件被编写用于发送未经授权的SWIFT信息并隐藏已发送的信息。恶意软件在发送窃取资金的SWIFT信息后，会删除转账的数据库记录，并进一步采取措施防止确认信息泄露盗窃行为。在孟加拉国案件中，确认信息本应出现在纸质报告上；恶意软件在报告发送到打印机时对其进行了篡改。在第二起案件中，银行使用的是PDF报告；恶意软件更改了PDF查看器以隐藏转账记录。[62]

In May 2016, Banco del Austro (BDA) in Ecuador sued Wells Fargo after Wells Fargo honoured $12 million in fund transfer requests that had been placed by thieves.[63] In this case, the thieves sent SWIFT messages that resembled recently cancelled transfer requests from BDA, with slightly altered amounts; the reports do not detail how the thieves gained access to send the SWIFT messages. BDA asserts that Wells Fargo should have detected the suspicious SWIFT messages, which were placed outside of normal BDA working hours and were of an unusual size. Wells Fargo claims that BDA is responsible for the loss, as the thieves gained access to the legitimate SWIFT credentials of a BDA employee and sent fully authenticated SWIFT messages.[63]
【参考译文】2016年5月，厄瓜多尔的Banco del Austro（BDA）起诉富国银行，因为富国银行兑现了窃贼发出的1200万美元资金转账请求。[63]在本案中，窃贼发送了与BDA最近取消的转账请求相似但金额略有改动的SWIFT信息；相关报道没有详细说明窃贼是如何获得发送SWIFT信息的权限的。BDA认为，富国银行本应检测到这些可疑的SWIFT信息，因为这些信息是在BDA正常工作时间之外发送的，且金额异常。富国银行则声称，BDA应对损失负责，因为窃贼获得了BDA员工合法的SWIFT凭证，并发送了经过完全验证的SWIFT信息。[63]

In the first half of 2016, an anonymous Ukrainian bank and others—even "dozens" that are not being made public—were variously reported to have been "compromised" through the SWIFT network and to have lost money.[64]
【参考译文】2016年上半年，据各种报道，一家匿名的乌克兰银行和其他一些银行（甚至有“数十家”未公开）通过SWIFT网络“遭到入侵”并损失了资金。[64]

In March 2022, Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung reported about the increased security precautions by the State Police of Thurgau at the SWIFT data centre in Diessenhofen. After most of the Russian banks had been excluded from the private payment system, the risk of sabotage was considered higher. Inhabitants of the town described the large complex as a "fortress" or "prison" where frequent security checks of the fenced property are conducted.[65]
【参考译文】2022年3月，瑞士报纸《新苏黎世报》报道了图尔高州警察局在迪森霍芬的SWIFT数据中心加强安全防范措施的情况。在大多数俄罗斯银行被排除在私营支付系统之外后，蓄意破坏的风险被认为更高。该镇居民将这个庞大的建筑群形容为一座“堡垒”或“监狱”，那里对围栏内的财产进行了频繁的安全检查。[65]