不便外发的段落 | 东南亚国家联盟 / ASEAN

正文7.1 领土争端 | Territorial disputes

文中可能包含无法从中国内地访问的链接。

Other meetings include the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting[221][222] that focus mostly on specific topics, such as defence or the environment,[223] and are attended by ministers. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which met for the first time in 1994, fosters dialogue and consultation, and to promote confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the region.[224] As of July 2007, it consists of twenty-seven participants that include all ASEAN member states, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, North and South Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, East Timor, the United States, and Sri Lanka.[225] Taiwan has been excluded since the establishment of the ARF, and issues regarding the Taiwan Strait are neither discussed at ARF meetings nor stated in the ARF Chairman's Statements.
【参考译文】东盟（ASEAN）的会议包括多种类型，如主要聚焦于特定议题（如国防或环境）的东盟部长级会议，以及由各国部长参加。自1994年首次召开以来，东盟地区论坛（ARF）旨在促进区域对话和协商，加强信心建设与预防性外交。截至2007年7月，ARF共有二十七个参与方，包括所有东盟成员国、澳大利亚、孟加拉国、加拿大、中国、欧盟、印度、日本、朝鲜和韩国、蒙古、新西兰、巴基斯坦、巴布亚新几内亚、俄罗斯、东帝汶、美国和斯里兰卡。台湾自ARF成立之初就被排除在外，且台湾海峡相关问题既不在ARF会议上讨论，也不出现在ARF主席声明中。

ASEAN also holds meetings with Europe during the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), an informal dialogue process initiated in 1996 with the intention of strengthening co-operation between the countries of Europe and Asia, especially members of the European Union and ASEAN in particular.[226] ASEAN, represented by its secretariat, is one of the forty-five ASEM partners. It also appoints a representative to sit on the governing board of Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), a socio-cultural organisation associated with the meeting. Annual bilateral meetings between ASEAN and India, Russia and the United States are also held.
【参考译文】东盟（ASEAN）还在亚欧会议（ASEM）期间与欧洲举行会议，这是一个1996年启动的非正式对话机制，旨在加强欧洲和亚洲国家之间的合作，特别是欧盟成员国和东盟成员国之间的合作。[226]东盟由其秘书处代表，是四十五名ASEM合作伙伴之一。它还任命一名代表参加亚欧基金会（ASEF）的理事会，该基金会是一个与会议相关的社会文化组织。东盟还与印度、俄罗斯和美国举行年度双边会议。

Prior to 2012, ASEAN foreign ministerial statements were not typically contentious.[206]: 90  Particularly as international disagreements over the South China Sea increased, the wording of ASEAN foreign ministerial statements became more politically contended.[206]: 90–91 
【参考译文】在2012年之前，东盟外长声明通常不会引起争议。[206]:90 特别是随着国际社会对南海争议的增加，东盟外长声明的措辞变得更加具有政治争议性。[206]:90-91

Following the 2022 visit by United States Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, ASEAN and individual member states reiterated their support of the One China policy.[206]: 89 
【参考译文】2022 年美国众议院议长佩洛西访问台湾后，东盟和各成员国重申支持一个中国政策。[206]: 89

正文7.1 领土争端 | Territorial disputes

文中可能包含无法从中国内地访问的链接。

7.1.1 南海 | South China Sea

Main article: Territorial disputes in the South China Sea【主条目：南海（南中国海）的领土争端】

With perceptions that there have been multiple incursions into the South China Sea by the PRC (China) and ROC (Taiwan), with land, islands and resources all having had previous overlapping claims between Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, and various other countries, the PRC and ROC's claim into the region is seen as intrusive by many Southeast Asian countries as of 2022, potentially a reflection of the threat of Chinese expansionism into the region.[228][229][230] This follows the 11 dash line that was produced by the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan), followed by the 9-dash line by the People's Republic of China (PRC). ASEAN sought for a more unified response against what it perceived to be Chinese penetration and hegemony into the region. There have been attempts to counterbalance this sway by attempting to align with other military alliances such as the nations in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD).[231]
【参考译文】人们认为，中华人民共和国 (中国) 和中华民国 (台湾) 曾多次入侵南海，越南、菲律宾、马来西亚、文莱、印度尼西亚和其他多个国家都曾对南海的土地、岛屿和资源提出过重叠的主张，截至 2022 年，许多东南亚国家认为中华人民共和国和中华民国对该地区的主张具有侵略性，这可能反映了中国对该地区的扩张主义威胁。[228][229][230] 这是继中华民国 (台湾) 提出的十一段线之后的又一划定的划定线，随后是中华人民共和国提出的九段线。东盟寻求对其所认为的中国对该地区的渗透和霸权做出更统一的回应。有人试图通过与其他军事联盟（如四方安全对话 (QUAD) 中的国家）结盟来平衡这种影响。[231]

Both the PRC (China) and the ROC (Taiwan) have employed several strategies to pursue their South China Sea claims, such as the salami slicing strategy and cabbage tactics from the PRC. There has also been calls to end the ROC (Taiwan)'s illegal military actions in the South China Sea, especially on Taiping Island (Itu Aba), which is referred to the East Sea in Vietnamese.[232] Additionally, China passed a law in January 2021 allowing its coast guard to fire on foreign vessels, causing greater concern amongst ASEAN states.[233] It is considered that the Cham people, an Austronesian people indigenous to Central and South Vietnam, were the "ancient rulers of the South China Sea", having had conducted extensive trade and maritime routes throughout the Southeast Asian region.[234]
【参考译文】中华人民共和国 (中国) 和中华民国 (台湾) 都采用了多种策略来追求其对南海的主权主张，例如中华人民共和国的切香肠策略和卷心菜战术。也有人呼吁停止中华民国 (台湾) 在南海的非法军事行动，特别是在太平岛 (Itu Aba)。[232] 此外，中国于 2021 年 1 月通过了一项法律，允许其海岸警卫队向外国船只开火，这引起了东盟国家的更大担忧。[233] 人们认为，占族人是越南中部和南部的南岛民族，是“南海的古代统治者”，曾在东南亚地区进行过广泛的贸易和海上航线。[234]

Within ASEAN, Cambodia is often supportive of the PRC's positions, including on the South China Sea issue.[235]: 211 
【参考译文】在东盟内部，柬埔寨经常支持中国的立场，包括在南海问题上的立场。[235]: 211

7.1.2 双边（争端）| Bilateral

There have been territorial disputes between ASEAN member states such as the Cambodian–Thai border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand, Cambodian–Vietnamese border dispute between Cambodia and Vietnam,[236] and the North Borneo dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia,.[237][238][239][240] The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, backed by the Soviet Union, was not accepted by ASEAN. They rejected it as a violation of the principles of regional integration. ASEAN cooperated with US and Australia to oppose Vietnam's move and it sponsored a Cambodian resolution in the United Nations General Assembly. ASEAN played a major role starting in 1980 in the peace process, leading to the 1991 Paris Agreement.
【参考译文】东盟成员国之间存在领土争端，例如柬埔寨与泰国之间的柬泰边界争端、柬埔寨与越南之间的柬越边界争端[236]，以及菲律宾与马来西亚之间的北婆罗洲争端[237][238][239][240]。1978 年，在苏联的支持下，越南入侵柬埔寨，但东盟不接受这一行为。东盟认为这违反了区域一体化原则。东盟与美国和澳大利亚合作反对越南的行动，并在联合国大会上提出了柬埔寨决议。自 1980 年以来，东盟在和平进程中发挥了重要作用，并促成了 1991 年的《巴黎协定》。

正文7.2.1 东盟10+3 | ASEAN Plus Three

In 1990, Malaysia proposed the creation of an East Asia Economic Caucus[241] composed of the members of ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea. It intended to counterbalance the growing US influence in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Asia as a whole.[242][243] However, the proposal failed because of strong opposition from the US and Japan.[242][244] Work for further integration continued, and the ASEAN Plus Three,[245] consisting of ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea, was created in 1997.
【参考译文】1990 年，马来西亚提议成立由东盟成员国、中国、日本和韩国组成的东亚经济核心小组[241]。其目的是制衡美国在亚太经合组织 (APEC) 和整个亚洲日益增长的影响力。[242][243] 然而，由于美国和日本的强烈反对，该提议未能成功。[242][244] 进一步一体化的工作仍在继续，由东盟、中国、日本和韩国组成的东盟+3[245] 于 1997 年成立。

ASEAN Plus Three[245] is a forum that functions as a coordinator of co-operation between the ASEAN and the three East Asian nations of China, South Korea, and Japan. Government leaders, ministers, and senior officials from the ten members of the ASEAN and the three East Asian states consult on an increasing range of issues.[246] The ASEAN Plus Three is the latest development of Southeast Asia-East Asia regional co-operation. In the past, proposals, such as South Korea's call for an Asian Common Market in 1970 and Japan's 1988 suggestion for an Asian Network, have been made to bring closer regional co-operation.[247]
【参考译文】东盟与中日韩三国[245] 是一个协调东盟与中国、韩国和日本三国合作的论坛。东盟十国和东亚三国的政府领导人、部长和高级官员就越来越多的问题进行磋商。[246] 东盟与中日韩三国是东南亚-东亚区域合作的最新发展。过去，曾提出过一些建议，以加强区域合作，例如 1970 年韩国呼吁建立亚洲共同市场，1988 年日本建议建立亚洲网络。[247]

The first leaders' meetings were held in 1996, and 1997 to deal with Asia–Europe Meeting issues, and China and Japan each wanted regular summit meetings with ASEAN members afterwards. The group's significance and importance were strengthened by the Asian Financial Crisis. In response to the crisis, ASEAN closely cooperated with China, South Korea, and Japan. Since the implementation of the Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation in 1999 at the Manila Summit, ASEAN Plus Three finance ministers have been holding periodic consultations.[248] ASEAN Plus Three, in establishing the Chiang Mai Initiative, has been credited as forming the basis for financial stability in Asia,[249] the lack of such stability having contributed to the Asian Financial Crisis.
【参考译文】第一次领导人会议于 1996 年和 1997 年举行，以处理亚欧会议问题，此后中国和日本都希望与东盟成员国定期举行峰会。亚洲金融危机加强了该组织的意义和重要性。为应对危机，东盟与中国、韩国和日本密切合作。自 1999 年马尼拉峰会实施《东亚合作联合声明》以来，东盟加三财政部长一直在定期举行磋商。[248] 东盟加三在制定清迈倡议时被认为构成了亚洲金融稳定的基础，[249] 缺乏这种稳定性是亚洲金融危机的原因之一。

Since the process began in 1997, ASEAN Plus Three has also focused on subjects other than finance such as the areas of food and energy security, financial co-operation, trade facilitation, disaster management, people-to-people contacts, narrowing the development gap, rural development, and poverty alleviation, human trafficking, labour movement, communicable diseases, environment and sustainable development, and transnational crime, including counter-terrorism. With the aim of further strengthening the nations' co-operation, East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) II was established at the 13th ASEAN Plus Three Summit on 29 October 2010 in Hanoi to stock-take, review, and identify the future direction of the co-operation.
【参考译文】自 1997 年启动以来，东盟与中日韩合作进程还关注金融以外的其他议题，例如粮食和能源安全、金融合作、贸易便利化、灾害管理、民间交流、缩小发展差距、农村发展和扶贫、人口贩运、劳工流动、传染病、环境和可持续发展以及包括反恐在内的跨国fan4 zui4。为进一步加强各国合作，2010 年 10 月 29 日在河内举行的第 13 届东盟与中日韩峰会上成立了第二东亚展望小组 (EAVG)，以盘点、审查和确定合作的未来方向。

2004年11月29日中华人民共和国与东盟在老挝首都万象签署“中国－东盟全面经济合作框架协议货物贸易协议”，朝推动成立自由贸易协议区（东盟十加一）的方向推进。为达到2010年中国—东盟自由贸易区物流零关税的目标，双方决定自2005年开始，针对部分货品开始协商免税，再逐渐扩大到2010年时达到全面免税的目标。另一方面，日本与韩国也宣布将自2005年开始，与东盟十国协商自由贸易区谈判，以作为成立东盟自由贸易区（十加三）的起步。[20]

The ASEAN Plus Three framework also serves as a platform for the ASEAN affiliated intergovernmental organizations in China, Korea, and Japan to meet and cooperate. The ASEAN-China Centre, the ASEAN-Japan Centre, and ASEAN-Korea Centre currently convene annually to discuss ongoing projects and to discuss possible areas of cooperation vis-a-vis ASEAN.[250]
【参考译文】东盟与中日韩框架也是东盟附属政府间组织在中国、韩国和日本会面和合作的平台。东盟-中国中心、东盟-日本中心和东盟-韩国中心目前每年召开一次会议，讨论正在进行的项目并讨论与东盟可能的合作领域。[250]

正文7.2.2（部分段落）东盟10+6 | ASEAN Plus Six

The economies in this region that have not joined the RCEP are: Hong Kong, India, Macau, North Korea and Taiwan.
【参考译文】该地区尚未加入RCEP的经济体有：香港、印度、澳门、朝鲜和台湾。

Hong Kong is actively seeking to join. Hong Kong itself has signed free trade agreements with ASEAN, New Zealand, Mainland China, and Australia. Mainland China welcomes Hong Kong's participation. According to the 2018 policy address of the Special Chief Executive, the Special Chief Executive She will start negotiations with RCEP member states after the signing of RCEP.[citation needed] As Asia's financial center and Asia's trading hub, Hong Kong can provide member countries with high-quality financial services.
【参考译文】香港积极争取加入，香港本身已与东盟、新西兰、中国内地、澳洲等签订自贸协定，内地欢迎香港参与，根据行政长官特别行政区2018年施政报告，行政长官特别行政区将在RCEP签署后，与RCEP成员国展开谈判。香港作为亚洲金融中心、亚洲贸易枢纽，可为成员国提供优质金融服务。

India temporarily does not join the RCEP for the protection of its own market, but Japan, China, and ASEAN welcomes India's participation.[256] The members stated that "the door will always be open" and promised to create convenient conditions for India to participate in RCEP. And India itself has signed free trade agreements with ASEAN, Japan and South Korea.
【参考译文】印度出于保护自身市场考虑，暂时不加入RCEP，但日本、中国、东盟等均欢迎印度加入。[256]各成员国均表示“大门永远敞开”，并承诺为印度参与RCEP创造便利条件。而印度本身也已与东盟、日本、韩国签署了自贸协定。

As a free trade port, Macau's tax rate itself is very low. Macau's economy does not depend on import and export trade. Tourism and gaming are the main economic industries in Macau. The Macau government did not state whether to join RCEP. Macau still[when?] has room for openness in the service industry.[citation needed]
【参考译文】澳门作为自由贸易港，税率本身就很低，澳门经济不依赖进出口贸易，旅游博彩业是澳门主要经济产业，澳门特区政府未表态是否加入RCEP，澳门在服务业仍有开放空间。

Taiwan has been excluded from participating with the organization owing to China's influence on the Asia Pacific through its economic and diplomatic influence.[257] Because Taiwan itself has a New Southbound Policy, the inability to join the RCEP is expected to have little impact on Taiwan.[according to whom?] At the same time, Taiwan is also considering whether to cancel ECFA to counter China.[citation needed]
【参考译文】由于中国大陆通过其经济和外交影响力对亚太地区产生影响，中国台湾被排除在该组织之外。[257] 由于台湾本身有新南向政策，因此无法加入 RCEP 预计对台湾影响不大。[据谁说？] 与此同时，台湾也在考虑是否取消 ECFA 以对抗中国。[需要引证]

正文14.（部分段落）全球影响和局限 | Global influence and reception

此外，东盟规条规定不干涉成员国内政，1990年缅甸军政府不承认选举落败的结果，更软禁了昂山素季，但是缅甸仍可于1997年加入东盟。

东盟在维护东南亚地区和平方面取得较大成效，早在1978年越南入侵柬埔寨时，东盟五个始创成员国（泰国、马来西亚、新加坡、菲律宾、印尼）已不定时举行联合军事演习，最终更成功使越南于1989年从柬埔寨撤兵。

1984年1月1日，文莱独立，1月7日加入东盟，成为东盟第六个成员国，六国于1986年合作，举办东盟旅游年，推广东南亚旅游业，其后合作增大，容纳过往关系疏离的成员国（老挝、缅甸、柬埔寨）甚至是曾经敌对的越南，至今除东帝汶外，所有东南亚国家已经加入东盟，东盟也不再满足于区域合作，找寻新的合作伙伴，例如印度、中国、日本、韩国、美国、欧盟等，东南亚国家的国际地位也大幅提高，此为东盟的成效。

Critics have charged ASEAN with weakly promoting human rights and democracy, particularly in junta-led Myanmar.[312] Some scholars think that non-interference has hindered ASEAN efforts to handle the Myanmar issue, human rights abuse, and haze pollution in the area. Despite global outrage at the military crack-down on unarmed protesters in Yangon, ASEAN has refused to suspend Myanmar as a member and also rejects proposals for economic sanctions.[313] This has caused concern as the European Union has refused to conduct free trade negotiations at a regional level for these political reasons.[314] During a UN vote against the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya, most member states voted to either abstain or against the condemnation. Only the Muslim-majority countries Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei voted to condemn the cleansing of Rohingya.[315] Some international observers view ASEAN as a "talk shop",[316] stating that the organisation is: "big on words, but small on action".[317] "ASEAN policies have proven to be mostly rhetoric, rather than actual implementation", according to Pokpong Lawansiri, a Bangkok-based independent analyst of ASEAN. "It has been noted that less than 50% of ASEAN agreements are actually implemented, while ASEAN holds more than six hundred meetings annually".[318]
【参考译文】批评者指责东盟在促进人权和民主方面表现软弱，特别是在军政府领导的缅甸。一些学者认为，不干涉原则阻碍了东盟处理缅甸问题、人权滥用和该地区的雾霾污染的努力。尽管全球对军政府镇压仰光手无寸铁的抗议者感到愤怒，但东盟拒绝暂停缅甸的成员资格，也拒绝了经济制裁的提议。这引起了关注，因为欧盟拒绝出于这些政治原因在区域级别进行自由贸易谈判。在联合国针对罗兴亚人种族清洗的投票中，大多数成员国选择弃权或反对谴责。只有穆斯林占多数的国家马来西亚、印度尼西亚和文莱投票谴责清洗罗兴亚人。一些国际观察员将东盟视为“空谈俱乐部”，称该组织“言辞多于行动”。曼谷的独立分析师Pokpong Lawansiri表示：“东盟的政策被证明大多是修辞，而非实际执行。”他指出，不到50%的东盟协议得到实际执行，而东盟每年举行的会议超过六百次。

The head of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Tim Huxley, cites the diverse political systems present in the grouping, including many young states, as a barrier to far-reaching co-operation beyond economics. He also asserts that, without an external threat to rally against after the Cold War ended, ASEAN has less successfully restrained its members and resolved such border disputes as those between Myanmar and Thailand or Indonesia and Malaysia.[319] During the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, several activist groups staged anti-globalisation protests,[320] arguing that the agenda of economic integration would negatively affect industries in the Philippines and would deprive thousands of Filipinos of their jobs.[321]
【参考译文】国际战略研究所所长蒂姆·赫克斯利指出，该组织内部存在多样化的政治体系，包括许多年轻国家，这是阻碍超越经济领域进行深远合作的障碍。他还声称，在冷战结束后，没有了外部威胁来团结对抗，东盟在约束其成员和解决如缅甸与泰国或印度尼西亚与马来西亚之间的边界争端方面不太成功。在第12届东盟峰会期间，几个活动团体在宿雾举行了反全球化抗议，他们争论说，经济一体化的议程将对菲律宾的产业产生负面影响，并将使成千上万的菲律宾人失去工作。

Corruption remains a widespread issue, as "tea money" remains an important requirement to grease business transactions and to receive public services. Following the release of the Corruption Perceptions Index 2015 by Berlin-based graft watchdog Transparency International on 27 January, its Asia Pacific director, Srirak Plipat, noted that: "if there was one common challenge to unite the Asia-Pacific region, it would be corruption", noting that: "from campaign pledges to media coverage to civil society forums, corruption dominates the discussion. Yet despite all this talk, there's little sign of action."[322]
【参考译文】腐败仍然是一个普遍存在的问题，因为“茶钱”仍然是润滑商业交易和接受公共服务的重要要求。在柏林的反腐败监督机构透明国际于1月27日发布《2015年腐败感知指数》后，其亚太地区主任斯里拉克·普利帕特指出：“如果有一个共同挑战能够团结亚太地区，那就是腐败”，他指出：“从竞选承诺到媒体报道到民间社会论坛，腐败主导了讨论。然而尽管有这么多讨论，却几乎没有采取行动的迹象。”

正文15.1 海盗行为 | Piracy

Piracy in the strait of Malacca and in the Sulu and Celebes Sea is one of the main non-traditional security threats for the region, it has challenged the capacity of its members to ensure coordination of effective policy actions to reduce this phenomenon. As highlighted by the ReCAAP report of 2020: "The increase of incidents (in Asia) during January–June 2020 occurred in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, South China Sea and Singapore Strait."[338] The increment of incidents during 2020, have raised alerts in the region as the phenomenon of piracy could be fostered by the social consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, in their Fourteenth Asean Ministerial Meeting On Transnational Crime[339] the ministers agreed that ASEAN should embrace a greater commitment to strengthen the measures in combating transnational crime in the context of the pandemic. Despite this statement, ASEAN has not updated their plans for combating piracy, although member states created and enforced the Maritime Security Plan of Action 2018-2020, to address the national legal enforcement capacities and creating a common protocol of action to counter piracy allowing the region to cooperate for ensuring the security of the Pacific Ocean, new discussions and agendas for new measures has not been enforced yet.
【参考译文】马六甲海峡、苏禄海和西里伯斯海的海盗活动是该地区的主要非传统安全威胁之一，它挑战了其成员国确保协调有效政策行动以减少这种现象的能力。正如《亚洲地区海盗和武装抢劫行动区域合作协定》2020 年报告所强调的那样：“2020 年 1 月至 6 月期间，孟加拉国、印度、印度尼西亚、菲律宾、越南、南海和新加坡海峡发生的海盗事件有所增加。”[338] 2020 年海盗事件的增加引起了该地区的警惕，因为海盗现象可能因新冠肺炎疫情的社会后果而加剧，在第十四届东盟跨国犯罪问题部长级会议上[339]，部长们一致认为，在疫情背景下，东盟应加大力度，加强打击跨国犯罪的措施。尽管东盟发表了上述声明，但东盟尚未更新其打击海盗的计划。尽管成员国制定并实施了《2018-2020年海上安全行动计划》，以解决国家执法能力问题，并制定了打击海盗的共同行动议定书，使该地区能够合作确保太平洋的安全，但新的讨论和新措施的议程尚未实施。

Accordingly, this plan reinforces the necessity to secure the seas due to the importance of this region geographical and economically, its strategic position as the main link between the Indian and the Pacific Ocean and the region serving as the main passage that connects middle east economies and India with China, Japan, South Korea and Australia. This plan is mainly focused in three priorities:[340]
【参考译文】因此，该计划强调了确保海上安全的必要性，因为该地区在地理和经济上具有重要意义，是印度洋和太平洋之间主要通道的战略位置，也是连接中东经济体和印度与中国、日本、韩国和澳大利亚的主要通道。该计划主要侧重于三个优先事项：[340]

1. Shared Awareness and exchange of best practices.
   【参考译文】共享意识和交流最佳实践。

2. Confidence building measures based on international and regional legal frameworks, arrangements and cooperation.
   【参考译文】基于国际和区域法律框架、安排和合作的信任建立措施。

3. Capacity building and enhancing cooperation of maritime law enforcement agencies in the region.
   【参考译文】加强本地区海上执法机构的能力建设和合作。

In this sense, spread all over the countries of Southeast Asia, criminal organizations with complex structures pose a challenge to ASEAN's coordination capacity to solve the problem despite the plans created within its institutional framework. Although some measures have been implemented by ASEAN,[341] still the complexity of the problem requires deep solutions of cooperation that might alter the balance of its framework. The maritime security plans for the region are based on the ASEAN idea of political-security community; the two main objectives of the APSC are: "to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development by promoting an identity of equality and partnership as the main foundations of peace and prosperity".[341] Additionally, the APSC promotes "regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter".[342]
【参考译文】在这个意义上，遍布东南亚各国的复杂结构的犯罪组织对东盟解决该问题的协调能力构成了挑战，尽管在其机构框架内制定了计划。虽然东盟已经实施了一些措施，但问题的复杂性仍然需要深入的合作解决方案，这可能会改变其框架的平衡。该地区的海上安全计划基于东盟政治-安全社区的理念；APSC的两个主要目标是：“通过促进平等和伙伴关系的身份认同作为和平与繁荣的主要基础，加速经济增长、社会进步和文化发展”。此外，APSC通过在区域国家间关系中严格遵守正义和法治以及遵守联合国宪章原则，促进“区域和平与稳定”。

Nonetheless, the institutional framework and decision-making procedures in ASEAN make difficult to reach agreements on piracy. ASEAN has struggled to deliver a coordinated response to solve this problem in the region mainly by two reasons: the first one, could be related to the focalized nature of the problem in subregions rather than the whole region. Consequently, this focalization generates that the discussions in the main forums (The ASEAN maritime forum (AMF) and Maritime Security Expert Working Group (MSEWG)) have not resulted in actual measures that tackle piracy and involve all member states as major consensus should be reached to enforce them. One example of this, is the possibility discussed by the 10 ASEAN member states to create a joint ASEAN navy in 2015 to carry on operations in one of the piracy hotspots in the region,[343] the strait of Malacca, this proposal ended up being enforced by bilateral/sub-regional efforts rather than in the ASEAN framework (see ReCAAP for further information).[344][345][346] The second one, consensus on non-traditional security issues has been difficult to reach due to contradictory interest between member states, particularly in joint operations between navies and the reach of these joint operations. These issues are generated mainly by unresolved territorial disputes, specially in the maritime domain, at some extent they pose a challenge to ASEAN members in their capacity to cooperate in regards to the maritime security approach.[347]
【参考译文】尽管如此，东盟的体制框架和决策程序使得就海盗问题达成协议变得困难。东盟一直难以在该地区采取协调一致的应对措施来解决这一问题，主要有两个原因：第一个原因可能与问题集中在次区域而非整个地区有关。因此，这种集中化导致主要论坛（东盟海事论坛 (AMF) 和海事安全专家工作组 (MSEWG)）的讨论未能产生解决海盗问题的实际措施，也未能让所有成员国参与其中，因为必须达成主要共识才能执行这些措施。其中一个例子是，10 个东盟成员国于 2015 年讨论了组建一支东盟联合海军的可能性，以在该地区海盗热点之一马六甲海峡开展行动[343]，但这一提议最终由双边/次区域努力而不是在东盟框架内实施（有关更多信息，请参阅 ReCAAP）。[344][345][346]第二，由于成员国之间的利益存在矛盾，非传统安全问题难以达成共识，特别是在海军联合行动及其范围方面。这些问题主要是由尚未解决的领土争端引起的，特别是在海洋领域，在一定程度上对东盟成员国在海洋安全方面的合作能力构成了挑战。[347]

Consequently, a greater multilateral cooperation has been pushed by the members to solve the piracy challenges on economy, trading and security. Members of the ASEAN, have addressed the necessity for the regional organization to make some concessions and rearrangements to respond to the challenges that non-traditional security (specifically piracy) issues posse to the security of the ASEAN members. Despite the efforts and plans made by the ASEAN, this organization is expected to overcome the image of being regarded solely as a forum to discuss security issues. Two possible solutions has been proposed by some member states for this purpose: 1. Promoting relationships with other major actors regionally to overcome the short-time challenges and 2. Rearrange the institutional framework to "avoid contention and seek cooperation to maximize the aggregate ability in order to benefit from making the sea fulfil its economic, security and other goals".[347]
【参考译文】因此，成员国推动了更大的多边合作来解决经济、贸易和安全方面的海盗挑战。东盟成员已经指出，区域组织需要做出一些让步和重新安排，以应对非传统安全问题（特别是海盗问题）对东盟成员安全构成的挑战。尽管东盟做出了努力和计划，但该组织仍有望克服仅被视为讨论安全问题论坛的形象。为此，一些成员国提出了两个可能的解决方案：1. 促进与其他主要地区行为体的关系，以克服短期挑战；2. 重新安排机构框架，“避免纷争并寻求合作，以最大化整体能力，从而从实现海洋的经济、安全和其他目标中受益”。

正文15.2 未来安全框架 | Future Security Framework

In addition to piracy, there are several significant issues facing ASEAN today, including human rights violations, repression, and democratic backsliding. Across the region, various political leaders are known human rights abusers, however there is no proper accountability process, and often human rights violations are sidelined by economic or political interests.[348] Myanmar is in the midst of a devastating civil war, during which the military government that was installed following a coup d’état, has carried out horrendous human rights violations against the Rohingya population.[349] The non-interference principle upon which ASEAN was founded further complicates the situation as countries must respect one another’s sovereignty, and have pledged not to become involved in the domestic affairs of other ASEAN members. ASEAN and other multilateral institutions can continue to practice non-interference while working towards an overarching policy or agreement that holds political leaders accountable for repeated human rights abuses. However, their fundamental principles of non-interference and consensus-building that were vital in helping coordinate responses to the COVID-19 pandemic are proving to be obstacles, as states have different stances on handling human rights concerns which could prevent a consensus from being reached and stall any sort of response to the inhumane crimes.
【参考译文】除了海盗问题，东盟今天还面临几个重大问题，包括人权侵犯、压迫和民主倒退。在该地区，各种政治领导人以侵犯人权而闻名，然而没有适当的问责流程，而且人权侵犯常常被经济利益或政治利益所忽视。缅甸正处于毁灭性内战中，军事政府在政变后上台，对罗兴亚人进行了可怕的人权侵犯。东盟成立的不干涉原则进一步复杂化了局势，因为各国必须尊重彼此的主权，并承诺不介入其他东盟成员国的内政。东盟和其他多边机构可以继续实行不干涉政策，同时努力制定一个总体政策或协议，让政治领导人对反复的人权侵犯负责。然而，它们的基本不干涉和共识建设原则在帮助协调应对COVID-19大流行方面至关重要，但证明是障碍，因为各国在处理人权问题上的立场不同，这可能阻止达成共识并阻碍对不人道罪行的任何回应。

A comprehensive security framework must emphasize security cooperation and peaceful resolution of disputes. Scholars argue that given the highly interconnected nature of the current world, countries must work towards a "broader conception of security beyond military security".[350] When ASEAN was founded in 1976, the world was embroiled in the Cold War, and military strength and preparedness was at the forefront of security policy for many states, both long-established and newly independent. The transition from a bipolar globe during the mid to late 20th century to a modern multipolar stage has driven the need and rise of multilateral institutions. Given the ongoing hegemonic battle between the United States and China, a successful comprehensive security framework for ASEAN would be one that prevents one state from overpowering the others and reinforces the central consensus-building principle of ASEAN. Not only can a comprehensive framework strengthen security relations among ASEAN members, but also foster economic integration and build greater trust among partners.
【参考译文】一个全面的安全框架必须强调安全合作和和平解决争端。学者们认为，鉴于当今世界高度相互联系的性质，各国必须朝着“超越军事安全的更广泛的安全概念”努力。1976年东盟成立时，世界正处于冷战之中，对许多国家而言，无论是早已建立还是新独立的国家，军事力量和准备是安全政策的前沿。从20世纪中后期的双极世界向现代多极阶段的过渡，推动了多边机构的需求和兴起。鉴于美国和中国之间持续的霸权斗争，一个成功的全面安全框架对于东盟来说，将是防止一个国家压倒其他国家并加强东盟核心共识建设原则的框架。一个全面的框架不仅可以加强东盟成员之间的安全关系，还可以促进经济一体化并在伙伴之间建立更大的信任。