不便外发的段落 | 伊朗遭受的国际制裁 / International sanctions against Iran

正文9. 影响 | Effects

文中可能包含无法从中国内地访问的链接。

See also: Economy of Iran and Smuggling in Iran
【另见：伊朗的经济、伊朗的走私】

U.S. and EU leaders are trying to tighten restrictions on business with Iran, which produced 3.55 million barrels of crude a day in January, 11 percent of OPEC's total, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.[99]
【参考译文】美国和欧盟领导人正在试图加强对与伊朗的商业活动的限制。根据彭博社编制的数据，伊朗在一月份产出了每天355万桶原油，占OPEC总产量的11%。

—Bloomberg, 13 February 2012
——根据彭博社2012年2月13日的报道

The sanctions bring difficulties to Iran's $483 billion, oil-dominated economy.[60] Data published by the Iranian Central Bank show a declining trend in the share of Iranian exports from oil-products (2006–2007: 84.9%, 2007–2008: 86.5%, 2008–2009: 85.5%, 2009–2010: 79.8%, 2010–2011 (first three quarters): 78.9%).[100] The sanctions have had a substantial adverse effect on the Iranian nuclear program by making it harder to acquire specialized materials and equipment needed for the program. The social and economic effects of sanctions have also been severe,[101][102] with even those who doubt their efficacy, such as John Bolton, describing the EU sanctions, in particular, as "tough, even brutal."[103] Iranian foreign minister Ali Akhbar Salehi conceded that the sanctions are having an impact.[104] China has become Iran's largest remaining trading partner.[79]
【参考译文】制裁给伊朗占主导地位的4830亿美元石油经济带来了困难。伊朗央行发布的数据显示，伊朗出口石油产品的份额呈下降趋势（2006-2007年：84.9％，2007-2008年：86.5％，2008-2009年：85.5％，2009-2010年：79.8％，2010-2011年（前三个季度）：78.9％）。制裁使伊朗核计划更难获取所需的专业材料和设备，对伊朗的社会和经济产生了重大不利影响，即使是怀疑它们的有效性的人，比如约翰·博尔顿（John Bolton）也将欧盟制裁描述为“严厉，甚至残酷”。伊朗外长阿里·阿克巴尔·萨利希承认制裁产生了影响。中国已成为伊朗最大的贸易伙伴。

Sanctions have reduced Iran's access to products needed for the oil and energy sectors, have prompted many oil companies to withdraw from Iran, and have also caused a decline in oil production due to reduced access to technologies needed to improve their efficiency.[citation needed]According to Undersecretary of State William J. Burns, Iran may be annually losing as much as $60 billion in energy investment.[105] Many international companies have also been reluctant to do business with Iran for fear of losing access to larger Western markets. [Naseem, M(2017) International Energy Law].As well as restricting export markets, the sanctions have reduced Iran's oil income by increasing the costs of repatriating revenues in complicated ways that sidestep the sanctions; Iranian analysts estimate the budget deficit for the 2011–2012 fiscal year, which in Iran ends in late March, at between $30bn to $50bn.[106]
【参考译文】制裁减少了伊朗获取石油和能源部门所需产品的途径，促使许多石油公司撤出伊朗，并且由于减少了获取提高其效率所需技术的途径，也导致了石油产量的下降。[需要引用]根据美国国务院副国务卿威廉·J·伯恩斯的说法，伊朗每年可能会损失高达600亿美元的能源投资。[105] 许多国际公司也因担心失去更大的西方市场而不愿与伊朗做生意。[纳西姆，M(2017)国际能源法]。除了限制出口市场外，制裁还通过增加以复杂方式绕过制裁将收入汇回国内的成本，减少了伊朗的石油收入；伊朗分析师估计2011-2012财年的预算赤字，伊朗在3月底结束，介于300亿至500亿美元之间。[106]

The effects of U.S. sanctions include expensive basic goods for Iranian citizens, and an aging and increasingly unsafe civil aircraft fleet. According to the Arms Control Association, the international arms embargo against Iran is slowly reducing Iran's military capabilities, largely due to its dependence on Russian and Chinese military assistance. The only substitute is to find compensatory measures requiring more time and money, and which are less effective.[107][108] According to at least one analyst (Fareed Zakaria), the market for imports in Iran is dominated by state enterprises and state-friendly enterprises, because the way to get around the sanctions is smuggling, and smuggling requires strong connections with the government. This has weakened Iranian civil society and strengthened the state.[citation needed]
【参考译文】美国制裁的影响包括伊朗公民基本生活用品昂贵，以及民用飞机队伍老化且越来越不安全。根据军备控制协会的说法，国际对伊朗的武器禁运正在缓慢削弱伊朗的军事能力，主要是因为伊朗依赖俄罗斯和中国的军事援助。唯一的替代方案是寻找补偿性措施，这需要更多的时间和金钱，而且效果较差。[107][108] 根据至少一位分析师（法里德·扎卡里亚）的说法，伊朗的进口市场由国有企业和与政府关系良好的企业主导，因为绕过制裁的方式是走私，而走私需要与政府有强大的联系。这削弱了伊朗的民间社会并加强了国家力量。[需要引用]

The value of the Iranian rial has plunged since autumn 2011, it is reported to have devalued up to 80%, falling 10% immediately after the imposition of the EU oil embargo[109] since early October 2012,[110] causing widespread panic among the Iranian public.[106] In January 2012, the country raised the interest rate on bank deposits by up to 6 percentage points in order to curtail the rial's depreciation. The rate increase was a setback for Ahmadinejad, who had been using below-inflation rates to provide cheap loans to the poor, though naturally Iranian bankers were delighted by the increase.[106] Not long after, and just a few days after Iran's economic minister declared that "there was no economic justification" for devaluing the currency because Iran's foreign exchange reserves were "not only good, but the extra oil revenues are unprecedented,"[106] the country announced its intention to devalue by about 8.5 percent against the U.S. dollar, set a new exchange rate and vowed to reduce the black market's influence (presumably booming because of the lack of confidence in the rial).[111] The Iranian Central Bank desperately tried to keep the value of the rial afloat in the midst of the late 2012 decline by pumping petrodollars into the system to allow the rial to compete against the US dollar.[112] Efforts to control inflation rates were set forth by the government through a three-tiered-multiple-exchange-rate;[113] this effect has failed to prevent the rise in cost of basic goods, simultaneously adding to the public's reliance on the Iranian black-market exchange rate network.[112] Government officials attempted to stifle the black-market by offering rates 2% below the alleged black-market rates, but demand seems to be outweighing their efforts.[114][115]
【参考译文】伊朗里亚尔自2011年秋季以来贬值严重，据报道，其价值已经贬值高达80％，在欧盟对伊朗实施石油禁运后立即下跌了10％，引发了伊朗公众的广泛恐慌。2012年10月初以来，伊朗里亚尔价值不断下跌。2012年1月，伊朗政府为遏制里亚尔贬值，将银行存款利率提高了高达6个百分点。这次利率上调对总统艾哈迈迪内贾德来说是一个挫折，因为他一直在利用低于通货膨胀率的利率向穷人提供廉价贷款，尽管自然而然地，伊朗的银行家们对此次利率上调感到高兴。不久之后，就在伊朗经济部长宣布“没有经济理由”贬值货币的几天后，因为伊朗的外汇储备“不仅良好，而且额外的石油收入也是前所未有的”，伊朗宣布其打算将里亚尔对美元贬值约8.5％，设定新的汇率，并誓言减少黑市的影响（可能是因为人们对里亚尔失去信心而蓬勃发展）。伊朗央行在2012年底的贬值中拼命努力维持里亚尔的价值，通过向系统注入石油美元，让里亚尔与美元竞争。zheng4 fu3通过三层多汇率来控制通货膨胀率，但这一举措未能阻止基本商品价格上涨，同时增加了公众对伊朗hei1 shi4汇率网络的依赖。zheng4 fu3官员试图通过提供低于所谓黑市汇率2％的汇率来遏制hei1 shi4，但需求似乎超过了他们的努力。

Sanctions tightened further when major supertanker companies said they would stop loading Iranian cargo. Prior attempts to reduce Iran's oil income failed because many vessels are often managed by companies outside the United States and the EU; however, EU actions in January extended the ban to ship insurance. This insurance ban will affect 95 percent of the tanker fleet because their insurance falls under rules governed by European law. "It's the insurance that's completed the ban on trading with Iran," commented one veteran shipbroker.[116] This completion of the trading ban left Iran struggling to find a buyer for nearly a quarter of its annual oil exports.[61]
【参考译文】当主要的超大型油轮公司表示将停止装载伊朗货物时，制裁进一步收紧。此前减少伊朗石油收入的尝试失败了，因为许多船只通常由美国和欧盟以外的公司管理；然而，欧盟在一月份的行动将禁令扩展到了船舶保险。这项保险禁令将影响到95%的油轮船队，因为它们的保险受欧洲法律管辖的规则约束。一位资深船舶经纪人评论说：“正是保险完成了对与伊朗交易的禁令。”这项交易禁令的完成使伊朗难以为其近四分之一的年度石油出口找到买家。

Another effect of the sanctions, in the form of Iran's retaliatory threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, has led to Iraqi plans to open export routes for its crude via Syria, though Iraq's deputy prime minister for energy affairs doubted Iran would ever attempt a closure.[116]
【参考译文】制裁的另一个影响是伊朗威胁要关闭霍尔木兹海峡，这导致伊拉克计划通过叙利亚开放原油出口路线，尽管伊拉克能源事务副总理怀疑伊朗是否会尝试关闭海峡。

After Iranian banks blacklisted by the EU were disconnected from the SWIFT banking network, then Israeli Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz stated that Iran would now find it more difficult to export oil and import products. According to Steinitz, Iran would be forced to accept only cash or gold, which is impossible when dealing with billions of dollars. Steinitz told the Israeli cabinet that Iran's economy might collapse as a result.[117][118]
【参考译文】在伊朗银行被欧盟列入黑名单后被SWIFT银行网络断开连接之后，以色列财政部长尤瓦尔·斯坦尼茨（Yuval Steinitz）表示，伊朗现在将更难以出口石油和进口产品。据斯坦尼茨称，伊朗将被迫只接受现金或黄金，而在处理数十亿美元时这是不可能的。斯坦尼茨告诉以色列内阁称，伊朗的经济可能会因此而崩溃。

The effects of the sanctions are usually denied in the Iranian press.[119][120] Iran has also taken measures to circumvent sanctions, notably by using front countries or companies and by using barter trade.[121] At other times the Iranian government has advocated a "resistance economy" in response to sanctions, such as using more oil internally as export markets dry up and import substitution industrialization of Iran.[122][123]
【参考译文】制裁的影响通常在伊朗媒体上被否认。伊朗还采取了规避制裁的措施，特别是通过使用前置国家或公司以及通过以物易物贸易。其他时候，伊朗政府提倡对制裁采取“抵抗经济”措施，例如在出口市场干涸和国内替代工业化的情况下，更多地在国内使用石油，以及进行伊朗的进口替代工业化。

In October 2012, Iran began struggling to halt a decline in oil exports which could plummet further due to Western sanctions, and the International Energy Agency estimated that Iranian exports fell to a record of 860,000 bpd in September 2012 from 2.2 million bpd at the end of 2011. The results of this fall led to a drop in revenues and clashes on the streets of Tehran when the local currency, the rial, collapsed. The output in September 2012 was Iran's lowest since 1988.[124]
【参考译文】根据您提供的信息，伊朗在2012年10月开始努力阻止石油出口的下降，这可能会因西方制裁而进一步下降。国际能源署估计，伊朗的石油出口从2011年底的每日220万桶下降到2012年9月的创纪录的86万桶。这一下降导致了收入的减少，在德黑兰的街头发生了冲突，当地货币里亚尔崩溃。2012年9月的产量是伊朗自1988年以来的最低水平。这些事件反映出制裁对伊朗经济的影响，同时也对伊朗社会和政治局势产生了重大影响。

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast has said that the sanctions were not just aimed at Iran's nuclear program and would continue even if the nuclear dispute was resolved.[125]
【参考译文】伊朗外交部发言人拉敏·梅赫曼帕拉斯特（Ramin Mehmanparast）表示，制裁不仅针对伊朗的核计划，即使核争端得到解决，制裁也将继续。这表明制裁对伊朗的影响超出了核计划问题，可能涉及更广泛的议题。

In 2018, as a response to US visa restrictions for those who have visited Iran after 2011, Iran ceased affixing visas in passports and stamping passports on entry of foreigners from most countries.[126][127][128]
【参考译文】2018年，作为对美国实施的限制曾在2011年之后访问过伊朗的人员签证的回应，伊朗停止在护照上盖章和签发签证，对大多数国家外国人入境不再在护照上盖章。

正文9.1 “抵抗经济”| "Resistance economy"

In the face of increased economic pressure from the United States and Europe and a marked decrease of oil exports,[2] Iran has sought to manage the impact of international sanctions and limit capital outflows by seeking to build a "resistance economy,"[129][130] replacing imports with domestic goods and banning luxury imports such as computers and mobile phones.[131] This is predicted to lead to an increase in smuggling, as "people will find a way to smuggle in what the Iranian consumer wants."[132] In 2012, Iran attempted to sell more crude to Chinese and Indian refiners, but China—the single-largest buyer of Iranian crude—has been curtailing its oil imports from Iran down to half their former level.[61]
【参考译文】面对美国和欧洲对伊朗施加的经济压力以及石油出口的显著减少，伊朗寻求通过建设“抵抗经济”来管理国际制裁的影响并限制资本外流。该政策包括替代进口商品，禁止奢侈品进口（如电脑和手机），并鼓励国内产品的使用。预计这将导致走私活动增加，因为“人们会找到走私进口伊朗消费者想要的商品的方式”。2012年，伊朗试图向中国和印度的炼油商出售更多原油，但中国作为伊朗原油的最大买家已经将对伊朗的石油进口削减到原来的一半。

On 20 October 2018 Association of German Banks stated that exports from Germany to Iran dropped 4% to 1.8 billion Euros since January.[133]
【参考译文】2018年10月20日，德国银行协会表示，自今年1月以来，德国对伊朗的出口额下降了4%，降至18亿欧元。

Iran has intensified industrial cooperation with the Russian Federation to support its petrochemical industry, despite sanctions. Iran increased the import of Russian natural gas through Azerbaijan, and is expanding the pipeline to Pakistan and Oman. In July 2022, Iran and Gazprom signed a memorandum of understanding worth US$40bn, supporting the development of the Kish Gas Field, and the North Pars Gas Field.[134]
【参考译文】伊朗已加强与俄罗斯联邦的工业合作，以支持其石化工业，尽管受到制裁的影响。伊朗通过阿塞拜疆增加了对俄罗斯天然气的进口，并正在扩建输气管道以供应巴基斯坦和阿曼。2022年7月，伊朗和俄罗斯天然气工业公司（Gazprom）签署了一份价值400亿美元的谅解备忘录，支持基什气田和北帕尔斯气田的开发。

In September 2022, after re-negotiations of the JCPOA were stalling, Iran increased its oil exports to China with favorable prices, circumventing economic sanctions.[135] Later that month, the U.S. imposed secondary sanctions on two Chinese entities, and an Indian petrochemical company that illicitly traded with Iranian oil.[136]
【参考译文】2022年9月，在《伊朗核问题全面协议》的重新谈判陷入僵局后，伊朗以优惠价格增加了对中国的石油出口，规避经济制裁。同月晚些时候，美国对两家中国实体和一家印度石化公司实施了次级制裁，因为它们非法与伊朗石油进行交易。

正文9.2 政治影响 | Political effects

See also: Politics of Iran【另见：伊朗的政治】

In 2012, 94 Iranian Parliamentarians signed a formal request to have Ahmadinejad appear before the Majles (parliament) to answer questions about the currency crisis. The Supreme Leader terminated the parliament's request in order to unify the government in the face of international pressure.[137] Nonetheless, Ahmadinejad has been called to questioning by parliament on a number of occasions, to justify his position on issues concerning domestic politics. His ideologies seem to have alienated a large portion of the parliament, and stand in contrast to the standpoint of the Supreme Leader.[dubious – discuss][138][139]
【参考译文】2012年，94名伊朗议员正式请求让艾哈迈迪内贾德出席议会，就货币危机问题作出解释。然而，最高领袖终止了议会的请求，以统一政府应对国际压力。尽管如此，议会多次要求艾哈迈迪内贾德接受质询，以证明他在国内政治问题上的立场。他的意识形态似乎已经疏远了议会的大部分成员，与最高领袖的立场形成了对比。【存疑，待讨论】

A report by Dr. Kenneth Katzman, for the Congressional Research Service, listed the following factors as major examples of economic mismanagement on the part of the Iranian government:
【参考译文】国会研究服务部Kenneth Katzman博士的报告列出了以下因素，作为伊朗政府经济管理不善的主要例子：

• The EU oil embargo and the restrictions on transactions with Iran's Central Bank have dramatically reduced Iran's oil sales – a fact acknowledged by Oil Minister Rostam Qasemi to the Majles on 7 January 2013. He indicated sales had fallen 40% from the average of 2.5 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2011 (see chart above on Iran oil buyers). This is close to the estimates of energy analysts, which put Iran's sales at the end of 2012 in a range of 1 mbd to 1.5 mbd. Reducing Iran's sales further might depend on whether U.S. officials are able to persuade China, in particular, to further cut buys from Iran—and to sustain those cuts.
  【参考译文】欧盟的石油禁运和对伊朗中央银行交易的限制极大地减少了伊朗的石油销售——这一事实在2013年1月7日由石油部长罗斯坦·卡塞米向议会（Majles）承认。他表示，销售量比2011年的日均250万桶下降了40%（见上图表关于伊朗石油买家）。这与能源分析师的估计接近，他们的估计将伊朗在2012年底的销售范围定在每日100万桶到150万桶之间。进一步减少伊朗的销售可能取决于美国官员是否能够说服中国特别是进一步削减从伊朗的购买量，并维持这些削减。

• Iran has been storing some unsold oil on tankers in the Persian Gulf, and it is building new storage tanks onshore. Iran has stored excess oil (21 million barrels, according to Citigroup Global Markets) to try to keep production levels up—shutting down wells risks harming them and it is costly and time-consuming to resume production at a well that has been shut. However, since July 2012, Iran reportedly has been forced to shut down some wells, and overall oil production has fallen to about 2.6 million barrels per day from the level of nearly 4.0 mbd at the end of 2011.
  【参考译文】伊朗一直在波斯湾的油轮上储存一些未售出的石油，并且正在陆上建造新的储油罐。据花旗集团全球市场部称，伊朗储存了过剩的石油（2100万桶），以试图保持生产水平——关闭油井可能会损害它们，而且恢复已关闭油井的生产既昂贵又耗时。然而，自2012年7月以来，据报道伊朗被迫关闭了一些油井，总体石油产量已从2011年底的近400万桶/日降至约260万桶/日。

• The oil sales losses Iran is experiencing are likely to produce over $50 billion in hard currency revenue losses in a one-year period at current oil prices. The IMF estimated Iran's hard currency reserves to be $106 billion as of the end of 2011, and some economists say that figure may have fallen to about $80 billion as of November 2012. Analysts at one outside group, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, believe Iran's hard currency reserves might be exhausted entirely by July 2014 at current rates of depletion. Compounding the loss of oil sales by volume is that many of its oil transactions reportedly are now conducted on a barter basis—or in exchange for gold, which is hard currency but harder to use than cash is. In addition, the 6 February 2013, the imposition of sanctions on Iran's ability to repatriate hard currency could cause the depletion rate to increase.
  【参考译文】伊朗正在经历的石油销售损失，在当前油价下一年内可能会导致超过500亿美元的硬通货收入损失。国际货币基金组织（IMF）估计，截至2011年底，伊朗的硬通货储备为1060亿美元，一些经济学家表示，这个数字可能已降至大约800亿美元，截至2012年11月。外部团体之一，国防民主基金会的分析师认为，按照目前的消耗速度，伊朗的硬通货储备可能在2014年7月前完全耗尽。除了石油销售量的损失外，据报道，伊朗的许多石油交易现在是以物易物的方式进行的——或者用黄金交换，黄金是硬通货，但比现金更难使用。此外，2013年2月6日对伊朗能力汇回硬通货的制裁可能会使耗尽率增加。

• On 15 October 2012, Iran said that to try to stretch its hard currency reserve, it would not supply hard currency for purchases of luxury goods such as cars or cellphones (the last 2 of the government's 10 categories of imports, ranked by their importance). The government is still supplying hard currency for essential and other key imports. Importers for essential goods can obtain dollars at the official rate of 12,260 to the dollar, and importers of other key categories of goods can obtain dollars at a new rate of 28,500 to the dollar. The government has also threatened to arrest the unofficial currency traders who sell dollars at less than the rate of about 28,500 to the dollar. The few unofficial traders that remain active are said to be trading at approximately that rate so as not to risk arrest.
  【参考译文】2012年10月15日，伊朗宣布为了尽量延长其外汇储备，将不再为购买豪华商品如汽车或手机提供硬通货（这两种商品是政府列出的10大进口商品中排名最低的两种）。政府仍会为必需品和其他重要进口商品提供硬通货支持。购买必需品的进口商可以以每美元12,260里亚尔的官方汇率获得美元，而其他重要商品的进口商可以以每美元28,500里亚尔的新汇率获得美元。政府还威胁要逮捕非官方货币交易商，他们以低于每美元约28,500里亚尔的汇率出售美元。少数仍在活跃的非官方交易商据说正在以接近这个汇率交易，以免被ju1 bu3。

• Some Iranians and outside economists worry that hyperinflation might result. The Iranian Central Bank estimated on 9 January 2013 that the inflation rate is about 27%—the highest rate ever acknowledged by the bank—but many economists believe the actual rate is between 50% and 70%.[citation needed] This has caused Iranian merchants to withhold goods or shut down entirely because they are unable to set accurate prices. Almost all Iranian factories depend on imports and the currency collapse has made it difficult for Iranian manufacturing to operate.
  【参考译文】一些伊朗人和外部经济学家担心这可能会导致恶性通货膨胀。伊朗中央银行在2013年1月9日估计，通货膨胀率约为27%——这是该银行所承认的最高比率，但许多经济学家认为实际比率在50%到70%之间。[需要引用] 这导致伊朗商人因为无法设定准确价格而囤积商品或完全停业。几乎所有伊朗工厂都依赖进口，货币崩溃使得伊朗制造业难以运作。

• Beyond the issue of the cost of imported goods, the Treasury Department's designations of affiliates and ships belong to Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) reportedly are harming Iran's ability to ship goods at all, and have further raised the prices of goods to Iranian import-export dealers. Some ships have been impounded by various countries for nonpayment of debts due on them.
  【参考译文】除了进口商品成本问题之外，据报道，美国财政部指定属于伊斯兰共和国伊朗航运公司（IRISL）的附属机构和船只，这损害了伊朗运输任何货物的能力，并进一步提高了伊朗进出口商的商品价格。一些船只因未支付到期债务而被不同国家扣押。

• Suggesting Iran's operating budget is already struggling; some reports say the government has fallen behind in its payments to military personnel and other government workers. Others say the government has begun "means testing" in order to reduce social spending payments to some of the less needy families. In late 2012, it also postponed phase two of an effort to wean the population off subsidies, in exchange for cash payments of about $40 per month to 60 million Iranians. Phase one of that program began in December 2010 after several years of debate and delay, and was praised for rationalizing gasoline prices.[clarification needed] Gasoline prices now run on a tiered system in which a small increment is available at the subsidized price of about $1.60 per gallon, but amounts above that threshold are available only at a price of about $2.60 per gallon, close to the world price. Before the subsidy phase-out, gasoline was sold for about 40 cents per gallon.
  【参考译文】伊朗的运营预算已经陷入困境；一些报道称政府已经拖欠了军事人员和其他政府工作人员的工资。还有报道称政府已经开始实施“资格审查”，以减少向一些不那么需要的家庭的社会支出。2012年底，政府还推迟了一项旨在以每月约40美元的现金支付来替代补贴的第二阶段计划。该计划的第一阶段始于2010年12月，经过数年的讨论和延迟后开始实施，并因为合理化汽油价格而受到好评。现在的汽油价格采用分级制度，低于一定额度的汽油售价约为每加仑1.60美元，而超过该阈值的部分则售价约为每加仑2.60美元，接近世界价格。在取消补贴之前，汽油的售价约为每加仑40美分。

• Press reports indicate that sanctions have caused Iran's production of automobiles to fall by about 40% from 2011 levels. Iran produces cars for the domestic market, such as the Khodro, based on licenses from European automakers such as Renault and Peugeot. The currency collapse has largely overtaken the findings of an IMF forecast, released in October 2012, which Iran would return to economic growth in 2013, after a small decline in 2012. An Economist Intelligence Unit assessment published in late 2012 indicates Iran's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) likely contracted about 3% in 2012 and will contract an additional 1.2% in 2013. ("Oil Sanctions on Iran: Cracking Under Pressure.")
  【参考译文】据报道，由于制裁的原因，伊朗的汽车产量从2011年水平下降了大约40%。伊朗生产供国内市场的汽车，如Khodro，它们是基于雷诺和标致雪铁龙等欧洲汽车制造商的许可生产的。货币崩溃已经大大超过了国际货币基金组织在2012年10月发布的一份预测报告，该报告预测伊朗经济在2013年将恢复增长，2012年略有下降。一份2012年底发表的经济学家智库评估报告指出，伊朗的国内生产总值（GDP）在2012年可能收缩了约3%，并将在2013年进一步收缩1.2%。（《对伊朗的石油制裁：承受压力》）

• Mitigating some of the effects are that some private funds are going into the Tehran Stock Exchange and hard assets, such as property. However, this trend generally benefits the urban elite.[140]
  【参考译文】一些私人资金正在投入德黑兰证券交易所和硬资产，如房地产，以减轻一些影响。然而，这一趋势通常有利于城市精英阶层。

In late September 2022, when violent unrest erupted in major Iranian cities due to the death of a 22-year-old Kurdish woman in police custody, Iranians had reported of harsh economic conditions due to sanctions, which in part were blamed for the public discontent.[141] Subsequent to the deadly crack-down by Iranian authorities, America and Europe had announced additional sanctions, while partly lifting limitations on communication technologies with Iran. But according to an analysis by Iranian exiles, Trump's "maximum pressure sanctions" had only exacerbated constraints on civil liberties in Iran, and likely contributed to the election of the "hardliner" Ebrahim Raisi. The International Crisis Group warned that efforts to "deepen Iran's domestic fault lines" were likely to cause the political élite in Iran to "close ranks and bring down the iron fist." Some Western analysts also point out that a weaker Iranian currency makes it harder for struggling citizens to purchase imported goods, disproportionally affecting women and ethnic minorities.[142]
【参考译文】在2022年9月底，由于一名22岁的库尔德女性在警方羁押期间死亡，伊朗主要城市爆发了严重的动荡。伊朗人报告称，由于制裁的原因，经济条件非常艰难，这在一定程度上被归咎于公众的不满情绪。在伊朗当局采取致命镇压行动后，美国和欧洲宣布了额外的制裁，同时部分解除了与伊朗的通信技术限制。但根据伊朗流亡者的分析，特朗普的“最大压力制裁”只会加剧伊朗的公民自由限制，并可能导致“强硬派”埃布拉希姆·拉伊西当选。国际危机组织警告称，试图“加深伊朗国内的矛盾”可能会导致伊朗政治精英“团结一致，用铁腕手段镇压”。一些西方分析人士也指出，伊朗货币贬值使得处境困难的公民更难购买进口商品，这对妇女和少数民族影响更大。

In September 2022, the IMF also concluded in a working paper, "coupled with low economic growth and high unemployment, rising inflation has fueled widespread protests in the country amid a significant erosion in purchasing power." According to an estimate by Iran's Ministry of Labour and Social Services, the web of Western sanctions has pushed one-third of Iranians into poverty. Conservative Iranian analyst Abdolreza Davari confirmed that economic despair is one of the major factors uniting those who are opposed to the Ebrahim Raisi-led government. The protests themselves were seen as a possible stumbling block to revive re-negotiations for the JCPOA, as more sanctions were imposed on Iranian officials.[143]
【参考译文】根据国际货币基金组织（IMF）2022年9月的一份工作文件，"伴随着低经济增长和高失业率，不断上涨的通货膨胀助长了伊朗国内范围广泛的抗议活动，同时也导致购买力显著削弱。"伊朗劳工和社会服务部门的估计显示，西方制裁措施已经使三分之一的伊朗人陷入贫困。保守派伊朗分析人士Abdolreza Davari证实，经济绝望是团结反对埃布拉希姆·拉伊西领导政府的人士的主要因素之一。kang4 yi4活动本身被视为重新启动《伊朗核问题全面协议》（JCPOA）重新谈判的可能障碍，因为对伊朗官员实施了更多制裁。

正文9.3 对油价的影响 | Effect on oil price

See also: Petroleum industry in Iran【另见：伊朗的石油工业】

According to the U.S., Iran could reduce the world price of crude petroleum by 10%, saving the United States annually $76 billion (at the proximate 2008 world oil price of $100/bbl). Opening Iran's market place to foreign investment could also be a boon to competitive U.S. multinational firms operating in a variety of manufacturing and service sectors.[144]
【参考译文】根据美国的说法，伊朗有可能将全球原油价格降低10%，每年为美国节省760亿美元（根据2008年大约每桶100美元的世界石油价格）。打开伊朗市场向外国投资也可能对在各种制造业和服务行业运营的竞争激烈的美国跨国公司带来好处。

On the other side, according to a 2012 study by former U.S. officials writing for the Bipartisan Policy Center, oil prices "could double" if Iran is permitted to obtain a nuclear weapon.[145] U.S. gross domestic product could fall by about 0.6% in the first year—costing the economy some $90 billion—and by up to 2.5% (or $360 billion) by the third year. This is enough, at 2012 growth rates, to send the U.S. into recession.[146]
【参考译文】根据美国前官员为两党政策中心撰写的一份2012年研究，如果伊朗获准拥有核武器，石油价格"可能会翻倍"。美国国内生产总值（GDP）在第一年可能会下降约0.6%，使经济损失约900亿美元，到第三年可能会下降高达2.5%（或3600亿美元）。根据2012年的增长率，这足以使美国陷入经济衰退。

In September 2018, Iranian oil minister Bijan Zanganeh warned U.S. President Donald Trump to stop interfering in the Middle East if he wants the oil prices to stop increasing. Zanganeh said, "If he (Trump) wants the price of oil not to go up and the market not to get destabilized, he should stop unwarranted and disruptive interference in the Middle East and not be an obstacle to the production and export of Iran's oil."[147]
【参考译文】2018年9月，伊朗石油部长毕珍·赞加内（Bijan Zanganeh）警告美国总统唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump），如果他希望石油价格不再上涨，就应该停止干涉中东事务。赞加内表示：“如果他（特朗普）希望石油价格不再上涨，市场不再动荡，他就应该停止无端和破坏性的干预中东事务，不要成为伊朗石油生产和出口的障碍。”

In October 2021, Iranian oil minister Javad Owji said if U.S.-led sanctions on Iran's oil and gas industry are lifted, Iran will have every capability to tackle the 2021 global energy crisis.[148]
【参考译文】2021年10月，伊朗石油部长贾瓦德·奥吉（Javad Owji）表示，如果美国领导的对伊朗石油和天然气行业的制裁被解除，伊朗将有能力应对2021年全球能源危机。

With economic sanctions in place against Iran, energy analysts expect a tight petroleum market well into 2023. In contrast to the United States, European countries would like to see a return of Iran (and Venezuela) to the global oil market to ease inflationary pressures worldwide.[149]
【参考译文】由于对伊朗实施经济制裁，能源分析师预计石油市场将在2023年进一步收紧。与美国形成鲜明对比的是，欧洲国家希望看到伊朗（以及委内瑞拉）重返全球石油市场，以缓解全球通货膨胀压力。

正文9.4 对区域经济的影响 | Impact on regional economies

See also: Economy of Iran【另见：伊朗的经济】

Iran relies on regional economies for conducting private as well as state-sponsored business. In 2018, after the U.S. re-imposed secondary sanctions, the trade relations with neighboring countries, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, which had increased significantly prior to 2016, took a significant hit.[150] In November 2019, when financial sanctions were further tightened by the Trump administration and the Rial devaluation continued, a subsequent increase in energy prices caused widespread protests and violent confrontations in Tehran and other major cities. The economies of border regions with urban areas, such as Zahedan, felt the most drastic impact as traders had to pay more for imports, e.g. electronic appliances, while at the same time, the export value for manufactured goods, such as Persian rugs, decreased.[151] Iraq's economy was also seriously affected by the continued financial sanctions since Iran is a major exporter of wheat to Iraq, and food prices increased in Iraq after 2016.[152]
【参考译文】伊朗依赖于地区经济来进行私营和国家赞助的业务。2018年，美国重新实施次生制裁后，与邻国（如阿富汗和伊拉克）的贸易关系受到了重大影响，这些关系在2016年之前曾显著增加。2019年11月，当特朗普政府进一步加强了金融制裁，伊朗里亚尔继续贬值之时，能源价格的相应增加导致德黑兰和其他主要城市爆发了大规模抗议和暴力冲突。像扎赫丹这样的边境地区经济受到的影响最为严重，因为商人不得不为进口商品（例如电器）支付更多，同时，像波斯地毯这样的制造商品的出口价值也在下降。伊拉克的经济也受到了持续的金融制裁的严重影响，因为伊朗是向伊拉克主要出口小麦的国家，2016年后伊拉克的食品价格上涨。

In early May 2020, with the parliamentary election of a new Iraqi prime minister, the U.S. extended Iraq's sanction waiver for the import of refined Iranian fuels and electricity from 30 days to 4 months in order to increase the political and economic stability in the region.[153]
【参考译文】在2020年5月初，随着伊拉克新任总理的产生，美国将对伊拉克进口精炼伊朗燃料和电力的制裁豁免期从30天延长到4个月，以增进该地区的政治和经济稳定。

According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur Idriss Jazairy, the reimposition of economic sanctions after the unilateral US withdrawal in 2018 "is destroying the economy and currency of Iran, driving millions of people into poverty and making imported goods unaffordable." He appealed to the United States and the European Union to ensure that Iranian financial institutions are able to perform payments for essential goods, including foods, medicines and industrial imports. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights stressed that "sanctions must not harm the human rights of ordinary citizens."[154]
【参考译文】根据联合国特别报告员伊德里斯·贾扎伊里的说法，2018年美国单方面退出后重新实施的经济制裁“正在摧毁伊朗的经济和货币，导致数百万人陷入贫困，并使进口商品价格高得难以承受。”他呼吁美国和欧盟确保伊朗的金融机构能够进行对包括食品、药品和工业进口在内的必需品的支付。联合国人权事务高级专员办事处强调，“制裁不应损害普通公民的人权”。

正文9.5 人道主义方面的影响 | Humanitarian impact

See also: Humanitarian impacts of U.S. sanctions against Iran, Healthcare in Iran, and Agriculture in Iran
【参见：美国对伊朗制裁的人道主义影响、伊朗的医疗保健和伊朗的农业】

Pharmaceuticals and medical equipment do not fall under international sanctions, but Iran is facing shortages of drugs for the treatment of 30 illnesses—including cancer, heart and breathing problems, thalassemia and multiple sclerosis (MS)—because it is not allowed to use international payment systems.[155] A teenage boy died from haemophilia because of a shortage of medicine caused by the sanctions.[156] Deliveries of some agricultural products to Iran have also been affected for the same reasons.[157]
【参考译文】药品和医疗设备并不受国际制裁限制，但伊朗因为无法使用国际支付系统而面临着药物短缺的困境，这些药物是用于治疗包括癌症、心脏和呼吸问题、地中海贫血和多发性硬化等30种疾病的。一名青少年因为制裁导致的药物短缺而死于血友病。由于同样的原因，一些农产品的交付到伊朗也受到了影响。

Drug imports to Iran from the U.S. and Europe decreased by approximately 30 percent in 2012, according to a report by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.[158] In 2013, The Guardian reported that some 85,000 cancer patients required forms of chemotherapy and radiotherapy that had become scarce. Western governments had built waivers into the sanctions regime to ensure that essential medicines could get through, but those waivers conflicted with blanket restrictions on banking, as well as bans on "dual-use" chemicals that might have a military as well as a medical application. An estimated 40,000 haemophiliacs could not get blood-clotting medicines, and operations on haemophiliacs were virtually suspended because of the risks created by the shortages. An estimated 23,000 Iranians with HIV/AIDS had severely restricted access to the drugs they need. The society representing the 8,000 Iranians suffering from thalassemia, an inherited blood disorder, said its members were beginning to die because of a lack of an essential drug, deferoxamine, used to control the iron content in the blood. Further, Iran could no longer buy medical equipment such as autoclaves, essential for the production of many drugs, because some of the biggest Western pharmaceutical companies refused to do business with the country.[159]
【参考译文】2012年，根据Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars的一份报告，从美国和欧洲向伊朗的药品进口减少了大约30%。2013年，《卫报》报道称，约85,000名癌症患者需要的化疗和放疗方式变得稀缺。西方国家政府在制裁体制中设立了豁免条款，以确保基本药品能够通过，但这些豁免与银行的全面限制以及对“双重用途”化学品的禁令相冲突，这些化学品可能既具有军事应用，也可能具有医学应用。据估计，约40,000名血友病患者无法获得止血药物，并且由于短缺带来的风险，血友病患者的手术几乎停止了。据估计，有23,000名伊朗艾滋病/艾滋病毒患者严重受限，无法获得他们所需的药物。代表着8,000名患有地中海贫血的伊朗人的社会表示，他们的成员因为缺乏控制血液中铁含量的基本药物地夫罗达明而开始死亡，地中海贫血是一种遗传性血液疾病。此外，伊朗也无法购买医疗设备，比如高压蒸汽灭菌器，这对于许多药物的生产至关重要，因为一些西方大型制药公司拒绝与伊朗进行业务往来。

Journalists reported on the development of a black market for medicine.[160] Though vital drugs were not affected directly by the sanctions, the amount of hard currency available to the ministry of health was severely limited. Marzieh Vahid-Dastjerdi, Iran's first female government minister since the Iranian Revolution, was dismissed in December 2012 for speaking out against the lack of support from the government in times of economic hardship.[161] Furthermore, Iranian patients were at risk of amplified side effects and reduced effectiveness because Iran was forced to import medicines, and chemical building blocks for other medicines, from India and China, as opposed to obtaining higher-quality products from Western manufacturers. Because of patent protections, substitutions for advanced medicines were often unattainable, particularly when it came to diseases such as cancer and multiple sclerosis.[162]
【参考译文】记者报道了医药品黑市的发展情况。尽管重要的药品并未直接受到制裁的影响，但卫生部获得的硬通货大大受到了限制。伊朗革命以来的第一位女性政府部长Marzieh Vahid-Dastjerdi于2012年12月因公开抨击政府在经济困难时期缺乏支持而被解职。此外，由于伊朗被迫从印度和中国进口药品和其他药品的化学原料，而不是从西方制造商那里获得更高质量的产品，伊朗患者面临着副作用加剧和疗效降低的风险。由于专利保护的原因，对于先进药物的替代品通常难以获得，特别是在涉及癌症和多发性硬化等疾病时。

China, the UK, the Group of 77 and experts are pressing the US to ease sanctions on Iran to help it fight the growing coronavirus outbreak.[163] "There is no doubt that Iran's capacity to respond to the novel coronavirus has been hampered by the Trump administration's economic sanctions, and the death toll is likely much higher than it would have been as a result," Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) Co-director Mark Weisbrot said. "There can also be no question that the sanctions have affected Iran's ability to contain the outbreak, leading in turn to more infections, and possibly to the virus's spread beyond Iran's borders."[164]
【参考译文】中国、英国、七十七国集团以及专家们正敦促美国放松对伊朗的制裁，以帮助伊朗应对不断加剧的新冠疫情。经济与政策研究中心（CEPR）联合主任马克·韦斯布罗特表示：“毫无疑问，特朗普政府的经济制裁已经严重影响了伊朗应对新冠病毒的能力，因此si3 wang2人数可能比实际情况高出很多。”“制裁无疑影响了伊朗遏制疫情的能力，进而导致更多的感染，并有可能导致病毒传播至伊朗的国界之外。”

On 6 April 2020, Human Rights Watch released a report urging the United States to ease sanctions on Iran "to ensure Iran access to essential humanitarian resources during the [coronavirus] pandemic."[165] The impact of sanctions on Iran made the COVID-19 management a difficult issue in Iran. While enduring crippling sanctions, the healthcare system fought COVID-19 with a low budget and inadequately equipped facilities. [166][167]
【参考译文】2020年4月6日，人权观察发布了一份报告，敦促美国放松对伊朗的制裁，以确保伊朗在新冠疫情期间能够获得必要的人道主义资源。制裁对伊朗的影响使得疫情管理成为伊朗的一个困难问题。在承受着严重的制裁的同时，卫生系统在预算不足和设施配备不足的情况下与新冠疫情作斗争。

In October 2020, Bloomberg reported that US sanctions had halted a flu vaccine shipment of 2 million doses. Iran's Red Crescent Society indicated how the drastic financial sanctions rendered the community Shahr Bank insolvent, which halted the crucial shipment.[168]
【参考译文】2020年10月，彭博社报道称，美国的制裁导致了一批200万剂流感疫苗的停运。伊朗红新月社表示，严厉的金融制裁导致沙赫尔银行破产，从而停止了这一关键货运。

正文9.6 对抗制裁的社会运动 | Civil movement against sanctions

The "Civil Movement" was initiated by two prominent Iranian economists—Dr. Mousa Ghaninejad, of Tehran's Petroleum University of Technology, and Dr. Mohammad Mehdi Behkish, of Tehran's Allameh Tabatabaei University—on 14 July 2013. They described the sanctions as an "unfair" and "illogical" tool, arguing that a freer economy would lead to less political enmity and encourage amicable relationships between countries. They also noted that sanctions against one country punish not only the people of that country, but also the people of its trade partners.[169]
【参考译文】“民间运动”是由两位著名的伊朗经济学家——德黑兰石油大学的穆萨·加尼内贾德博士和德黑兰阿拉梅·塔巴塔巴伊大学的穆罕默德·梅赫迪·贝哈基什博士于2013年7月14日发起的。他们认为制裁是一种“不公平”和“不合逻辑”的手段，认为更自由的经济将会减少政治敌意，并鼓励国家之间友好关系的建立。他们还指出，对一个国家的制裁不仅惩罚了该国的人民，也影响到了其贸易伙伴的人民。

The movement was supported by a large group of intellectuals, academics, civil society activists, human rights activists and artists.[169][170][171] In September 2013, the International Chamber of Commerce-Iran posted an open letter by 157 Iranian economists, lawyers and journalists criticizing the humanitarian consequences of sanctions and calling on their colleagues across the world to pressure their governments to take steps to resolve the underlying conflict.[172]
【参考译文】这一运动得到了大批知识分子、学者、民间社会活动人士、人权活动人士和艺术家的支持。2013年9月，国际商会-伊朗发布了一封公开信，由157名伊朗经济学家、律师和记者签署，批评了制裁所带来的人道主义后果，并呼吁世界各国的同行们向他们的政府施压，采取措施解决根本矛盾。

In April 2021, more than 40 grassroots organisations have called on US President Joe Biden's administration to lift restrictions that "have obstructed the flow of critical vaccines, medicine and humanitarian goods into Iran". Iran had struggled to acquire Western vaccines due to sanctions, and was one of the worst hit countries by the Covid-19 pandemic.[173]
【参考译文】在2021年4月，超过40个基层组织呼吁美国总统乔·拜登的政府解除对伊朗的限制，这些限制“阻碍了急需的疫苗、药品和人道主义物资流入伊朗”。由于制裁的影响，伊朗一直在努力获取西方疫苗，并且是新冠疫情中受影响最严重的国家之一。

See also: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
【另见：《世界人权宣言》】

正文9.7 被冻结的资产 | Frozen assets

After the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the United States ended its economic and diplomatic ties with Iran, banned Iranian oil imports and froze approximately 11 billion 1980-US dollars of its assets.[174]
【参考译文】1979年伊朗革命后，美国终止了与伊朗的经济和外交关系，禁止进口伊朗石油，并冻结了大约110亿美元的伊朗资产。

In the years of 2008 to 2013, billions of dollars of Iranian assets abroad were seized or frozen, including a building in New York City,[175] and bank accounts in Great Britain, Luxembourg,[176] Japan[177] and Canada.[178]
【参考译文】在2008年至2013年期间，数十亿美元的伊朗海外资产被扣押或冻结，包括纽约市的一栋大楼，以及在英国、卢森堡、日本和加拿大的银行账户。

In 2012, Iran reported that the assets of Guard-linked companies in several countries were frozen but in some cases the assets were returned.[179]
【参考译文】2012年，伊朗报告称，几个国家冻结了与伊朗革命卫队有关的公司的资产，但在某些情况下这些资产已经被归还。

The chairman of the Majlis Planning and Budget Committee says $100 billion of Iran's money was frozen in foreign banks because of the sanctions imposed on the country.[180] In 2013, only $30 billion to $50 billion of its foreign exchange reserves (i.e. roughly 50% of total) was accessible because of sanctions.[181]
【参考译文】伊朗议会计划和预算委员会主席表示，由于对伊朗实施的制裁，伊朗在外国银行被冻结了约1000亿美元的资金。在2013年，由于制裁的原因，伊朗仅能够动用其外汇储备中的300到500亿美元（即约总额的50%）。

Main article: Iran's frozen assets【主条目：伊朗被冻结的资产】
See also: Foreign exposure and transactions of Iran【另见：伊朗的对外风险暴露和交易】

正文10. 制裁解除 | Sanctions relief

When the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and the P5+1 was implemented in early 2016, sanctions relief affected the economy of Iran in four principal ways:[182]
【参考译文】2016年初，伊朗与P5+1实施了《联合全面行动计划》，制裁解除以四种主要方式影响了伊朗经济：[182]

1. Release of Iran's frozen funds abroad, estimated at $29 billion, representing approximately one third of Iran's foreign held reserves.[183]
   【参考译文】估计释放伊朗在海外被冻结的约290亿美元资金，约占伊朗在外汇储备的三分之一。

2. The removal of sanctions against exports of Iranian oil.
   【参考译文】取消对伊朗石油出口的制裁。

3. Allow foreign firms to invest in Iran's oil and gas, automobiles, hotels and other sectors.
   【参考译文】允许外国企业投资伊朗的石油和天然气、汽车、酒店和其他行业。

4. Allow Iran to trade with the rest of the world and use the global banking system such as SWIFT.
   【参考译文】允许伊朗与世界其他国家进行贸易，并使用国际银行系统，如SWIFT。

According to the Central Bank of Iran, Iran would use funds unfrozen by its nuclear deal mainly to finance domestic investments, keeping the money abroad until it was needed.[184]
【参考译文】根据伊朗中央银行的说法，伊朗将主要使用核协议解冻的资金来资助国内投资，直到需要时才将这些资金保留在国外。[184]

According to the Washington Institute in 2015: "The pre-deal asset freeze did not have as great an impact on the Iranian government as some statements from Washington suggested. And going forward, the post-deal relaxation of restrictions will not have as great an impact as some critics of the deal suggest."[185]
【参考译文】根据华盛顿研究所在2015年的说法：“协议前的资产冻结并没有像华盛顿的一些声明所暗示的那样对伊朗政府产生巨大影响。而且，向前看，协议后限制的放松也不会像一些批评者所暗示的那样产生巨大影响。”[185]

On 16 January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency said that Iran had adequately restricted its nuclear program, resulting in the United Nations lifting some of the sanctions.[186][187][188]
【参考译文】2016年1月16日，国际原子能机构表示伊朗已充分限制其核计划，导致联合国解除了部分制裁。[186][187][188]

In February 2019, France, Germany and the United Kingdom announced that they have created a payment channel named INSTEX to bypass the newly reimposed sanctions by the United States, following the unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA by the Trump administration.[189] The Trump administration warned that countries engaging in financial transactions with Iran could face secondary U.S. sanctions.[190]
【参考译文】2019年2月，法国、德国和英国宣布，他们创建了一个名为INSTEX的支付渠道，用以绕过美国新近重新实施的制裁，此举是跟随特朗普政府单方面退出JCPOA之后的行动。[189] 特朗普政府警告说，与伊朗进行金融交易的国家可能面临美国的次级制裁。[190]

In late January 2020, the Swiss Humanitarian Trade Arrangement (SHTA) with Iran was implemented, assuring export guarantees through Swiss financial institutions for shipments of food and medical products to the Islamic republic. Geneva-based bank BCP and a large Swiss drugmaker were participating in the initial pilot shipment of essential medicines worth 2.3 million euros ($2.55 million).[191]
【参考译文】2020年1月下旬，与伊朗的瑞士人道主义贸易安排（SHTA）开始实施，通过瑞士金融机构为向伊斯兰共和国出口食品和医疗产品提供出口担保。总部位于日内瓦的BCP银行和一家大型瑞士制药商参与了首批价值230万欧元（255万美元）的基本药品试运。[191]

According to one independent study in 2022, Iran could see a windfall of one trillion US dollars over 10 years if a new agreement is signed with the P5+1.[192]
【参考译文】根据2022年的一项独立研究，如果与P5+1签署新协议，伊朗在10年内可能会获得高达一万亿美元的意外之财。[192]

See also: Negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran
【另见：与伊朗谈判全面核协议】